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This paper examines the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on voluntary 
disclosure practices of Malaysian listed firms. The extent of voluntary disclosure is determined 
for a matched-sample of 100 listed firms in three different disclosure regimes during 1996, 
2001 and 2006. The findings suggest that regulatory reforms over the 1996-2006 period 
resulted in enhanced corporate transparency and accountability as reflected in more extensive 
voluntary disclosures. We provide empirical evidence that the extent of voluntary disclosures 
is significantly associated with the strength of corporate governance structure in 2001 and 
2006 and with ownership structure in 1996, 2001 and 1996. . The findings of this study are of 
use to regulators in terms of guiding policy development regarding corporate transparency of 
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The regulatory constraints of stock exchanges play an important role in the economic 
development of emerging or developing economies. Over the past decade, the Bursa 
Malaysia Stock Exchange (BMSE) has become an increasingly important avenue for listed 
firms to access capital. Disclosure of corporate information to stakeholders is essential in 
order for listed firms to raise capital. Hutton (2004) attests that corporate voluntary disclosure 
continues to be important because information is vital for the efficient functioning of capital 
markets and in building investor confidence. 
 
The extent of voluntary disclosure has been an area of interest to accounting researchers over 
the two past decades. Healy & Palepu (2001, p.407) believe that “financial accounting and 
disclosure will continue to be a rich field of empirical inquiry”. Beattie (2005) attributes 
changes in the business environment to the burgeoning research into voluntary disclosure. 
The 1997 crisis and the rampant corporate collapses provide examples of significant 
environmental change that have shaped corporate reporting and the governance landscape 
towards one characterized by greater transparency and accountability.  
 
This study investigates the determinants of voluntary disclosure practices of listed firms in 
Malaysia. The research questions are: (i) what is the extent of voluntary disclosures in the 
annual reports of Malaysian listed firms in the 1996, 2001 and 2006 financial years?; and (ii) 
are there statistically significant associations between the strength of corporate governance 
and ownership structure and the extent of voluntary disclosure of these firms? As Barako 
(2004) finds no great variation in the pattern of disclosure practices between consecutive 
years, this study evaluates the trend in disclosure practices at three key points in time: 1996, 
2001 and 2006. The period 1996-2006 encompasses the Asian financial crisis (1996), 
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governance reforms subsequent to the Asian financial crisis (2001) and regulatory and 
governance changes following the corporate collapses in Malaysia and globally (2006). 
Changes in the economic, financial and regulatory environment in each of the 1996, 2001 and 
2006 years are expected to result in more extensive changes in disclosure practices. Further, it 
is not unreasonable to expect that changes in the disclosure incentives and practices will 
come about as a consequence of these environmental changes.  
 
The study is motivated by transformation of the Malaysian corporate reporting and 
governance environment over the 1996-2006 period. These environmental changes provide a 
unique institutional setting for this research. Over the past decade, numerous initiatives have 
been implemented by Malaysian regulatory authorities to enhance corporate transparency and 
accountability. It is an open question as to what extent the subsequent action of reforms 
influence the variation in the level of information voluntarily disclosed by Malaysian listed 
firms. Another feature that motivates this study is the concentrated ownership structures of 
Malaysian corporations. The World Bank (1999) reports that, on average, 60% of the total 
equity in Malaysian listed firms is held by the top five shareholders. The impact of ownership 
structure is of particular significance as Malaysia endeavours to become a major international 
capital market (Shimomoto, 1999). In a capital market setting, the ability of firms to raise 
capital for investment and growth at competitive rates depends on firm’s communication 
strategies with investors. Disclosure serves as a strategic communication tool for firms to 
convey essential information to investors in emerging markets such as Malaysia. The higher 
transparency expectations pose an important challenge to Malaysian listed firms in providing 
credible disclosure. Accordingly, the study of information disclosure of a voluntary nature 




Based on a matched-sample of 100 Malaysian listed firms in each of the 1996, 2001 and 2006 
years, we find that there is an increase in the extent of Malaysian listed firm’s voluntary 
disclosures in annual reports from 1996 to 2006. Overall, the result shows that firms with 
enhanced corporate governance structure and concentrated ownership structure are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose information. The findings provide evidence that regulatory 
changes in the Malaysian context served to increase the extent of voluntary disclosures of 
listed firms possibly owing to increased strength in governance reforms. 
 
This study provides a segmented longitudinal examination of voluntary disclosure patterns 
and its association with corporate governance structure and ownership structure subsequent to 
the implementation of regulatory initiatives in Malaysia. A unique corporate governance 
score comprising thirteen governance attributes is used to assess the strength of the corporate 
governance structure. The findings of this study are particularly relevant to regulators and 
policy-makers given the important roles that corporate governance structure and ownership 
structure play in mitigating agency problems.  
 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates the Malaysian 
corporate reporting and governance environment; Section 3 discusses relevant prior literature 
and the hypotheses; Section 4 describes the data and methodology; Section 5 presents the 
study findings and robustness testing; and Section 6 concludes the study with final comments, 
limitations and suggestions for future research.  
 
2.0  Corporate reporting and governance in Malaysia 
Prior to 1996, the Malaysian corporate reporting was self-regulated and intermittently 
overseen by accounting professional bodies, such as the Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
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and Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants. The regulatory regime that 
governed the financial reporting was merit-based where the firms disclosed the information 
as required and were accountable to regulators (Securities Commission, 1999). Since the 
disclosure was arguably not user-oriented, the limited information flow under this regime 
effectively lowered market incentives for greater disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). 
 
The Malaysian accounting landscape radically changed with the establishment of an 
independent, statutorily incorporated, accounting standard-setting body in 1997. This 
occurred at a time when Malaysian listed firms were subject to financial distress during the 
1997 East Asian financial crisis. Under the new financial reporting regime, the Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) were 
established under the Financial Reporting Act 1997 (FRA). Concomitantly, the Malaysian 
Securities Commission (MSC) shifted the regulatory regime to a disclosure-based regime 
(DBR) with greater expectations of firms to disclose information and to demonstrate greater 
accountability. The DBR entails the making of investment decisions by each prospective 
investor based upon the provision of sufficient and accurate information in publicly available 
documents. There is a greater market incentive for enhanced disclosure under the DBR 
(Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  
 
Subsequent to the 1997 Asian currency crisis, there was a concerted effort to raise the 
standard of corporate governance practices in Malaysia. In 1998, a High Level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (HLCG) was commissioned by the MSC to deal with 
the weakness in the corporate governance framework in Malaysia. This led to the issuance of 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) which was eventually introduced to 
the Malaysian corporate sectors in 2001. The MCCG aims to encourage disclosure by 
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providing investors with timely and relevant information to facilitate investment decision 
making (Abdul Rahman, 2006). 
 
A taskforce on Corporate Disclosure Best Practice was formed in October 2002 as part of 
BMLR to provide guidance on governance practices. They issued guidelines entitled Best 
Practices in Corporate Disclosure in August 2004. The guidance identifies practices to guide 
companies in complying with their disclosure obligations under the BMLR. Although these 
best practices are voluntary, listed firms are encouraged to incorporate these guidelines into 
their own disclosure practices with the purpose of assisting companies to move beyond 
minimum disclosure practices (Bursa Malaysia, 2004).  
 
From this overview of the regulation of corporate reporting and governance in Malaysia, it is 
apparent that these developments have had a substantial impact on a firm’s disclosure policy. 
The challenges for corporations and regulators are to continue to enhance the levels of 
transparency, governance and accountability in the Malaysian capital market.  
 
3.0 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Agency theory is most commonly used framework in the accounting literature to analyse 
voluntary disclosure choice. The theory models the relationship between the principal and the 
agent as identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The separation of the ownership and 
control gives rise to agency problems because of goals conflict between shareholders and 
managers (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the context of the firm, a major issue arising from such 
separation is the extent of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. The 
agency theory approach argues that a firm’s choice to disclose information is a function of 
managerial discretion to better solve the problem of information asymmetry. Voluntary 
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corporate disclosure is mainly driven by rational managers’ self-interest and their attempts to 
protect and enhance their reputation and remuneration. To the extent that voluntary disclosure 
is beneficial, managers need to apply their discretion in disclosing information to 
stakeholders, thereby reducing the costs of the agency relationship (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
 
Effective corporate governance offers crucial monitoring mechanisms to co-align managerial 
behaviour with owner preferences or to monitor the actions of the managers (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Core (2001) highlight that a firm’s governance 
structure can influence the nature of its disclosure policy in the sense that a well-designed 
governance structure can help ensure an optimal firm’s disclosure policy. Prior empirical 
studies have examined the association between corporate disclosure and specific governance 
attributes such as board independence, role duality, audit committee; but these studies 
produce inconclusive evidence. Recently, the use of an index-based corporate governance 
measure and its relation to corporate disclosure has started to gain researchers’ attention in 
recent years (Beekes and Brown, 2006; O’Sullivan, Percy, and Stewart, 2008; Taylor, Tower, 
and Neilson, 2010). According to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), such a direct proxy 
measure of corporate governance is more effective in capturing the strength of a firm’s 
governance structure. Byard, Li, and Weintrop (2006) and Beekes and Brown (2006) 
document better-governed firms make more informative disclosure in U.S. and Australian 
firms respectively. Similarly, Taylor, Tower, and Neilson (2010) document that the financial 
risk management disclosure patterns are significantly and positively associated with the 
strength of corporate governance structure. However, the primacy of corporate governance 
structure as an important determinant of a firm’s transparent policy is queried in O’Sullivan, 
Percy, and Stewart (2008).  They document that Australian firms disclosing forward-looking 
information typically experience a higher standard of corporate governance than non-
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disclosing firms in year 2000, but not in the 2002 year. In spite of the enhanced corporate 
governance structure in 2002, it does not lead to more extensive disclosures of forward-
looking information.   
 
Essentially, the adoption of the principles of corporate governance ensures management will 
act in the best interest of shareholders and investors and contribute to a reduction in 
information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory predicts that effective corporate 
governance can strengthen the monitoring and control of management, thereby reducing 
opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that effective corporate governance will have a positive impact on the 
extent of voluntary disclosures. Consistent with agency theory, this study hypothesizes: 
H1:  The strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure is positively associated 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Ownership structure is an important aspect of corporate governance particularly in 
determining the nature of the agency problem. Due to the separation of ownership and 
control, agency theory suggests that there is a high likelihood of agency conflict (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) with the potential for conflict to be greater when shares are widely held than 
when shares are tightly controlled (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The degree of separation 
between ownership and management determines the level of monitoring (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000) and thereby, the extent of voluntary disclosure. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that large (outside) ownership can help reduce agency conflicts due to their dominant 
power and incentive to prevent expropriation by insiders. In this regard, the dominant 
shareholders play a monitoring role and can be expected to put more pressure on management 




Empirically, Birt et al. (2006) find a positive association between ownership concentration 
and voluntary segment disclosure of Australian listed firms. They argue that when ownership 
is concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, they have the ability to mitigate agency 
problems by influencing information disclosure. Consistent with this view, Ho and Tower 
(2010) report that firm’s with concentrated ownership structure have greater incentives to 
provide more information. They contend that large (outside) shareholders act as guardian to 
minority shareholders in influencing firm’s disclosure choice. As such, greater information is 
disclosed in annual reports on a voluntary basis. Similarly, Jiang, Habib, and Hu (2011) 
acknowledge the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership 
structures in reducing information asymmetry in New Zealand. Consequently, the hypothesis 
to be tested is: 
H2:  The higher the proportion of shares held by the top 5 shareholders, the greater will 
be the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
To test H1 and H2, this study includes firm-specific non-governance characteristics as control 
variables (firm size, leverage and industry types) in order to minimise cross-sectional 
variation. These control variables are reported in extant literature as being associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Firm size has been identified as an important predictor of 
corporate reporting behaviour. Due to high agency costs, large firms have the incentive to 
disclose more information in their annual reports to enhance reputation, reduce public 
scrutiny and to deter government intervention. A large volume of empirical research 
documents a positive association between firm size and the extent of disclosure (Akhtaruddin 
and Haron, 2010; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Botosan, 
1997; Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari, 2002). From the perspective of agency theory, Jensen 
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and Meckling (1979) argue that high monitoring costs would be incurred by firms that are 
highly leveraged because there is more wealth to transfer from bondholders to shareholders. 
Management may voluntarily disclose more information in annual reports for monitoring 
purposes. Wallace, Naser, and Mora (1994) suggest that disclosure level is likely to vary 
based on industry, reflecting unique characteristics. Cooke (1989) draws attention to the 
likelihood that leading firms operating in a particular industry could have a bandwagon effect 
on the level of disclosure adopted by other firms within the same industry. 
 
3.0 Research Design 
3.1 Sample selection 
The sample is drawn from firms listed on the BMSE in 1996, 2001 and 2006. The following 
criteria is used in selecting sample firms: (i) the availability of annual reports of firms for all 
the three years; (ii) firms selected in 1996 must remain listed on the stock exchange in the 
other two years; and (iii) all banks, unit trust, insurance and finance companies are excluded 
from the study due to different regulatory and reporting requirements. The remaining firms 
are then subject to stratified random selection from five industry groups namely trading and 
services; construction; industrial products; plantation; and consumer products. A total of 100 
sample firms are randomly selected in 1996, which represents 31.8% of the population. These 
firms selected are chosen as the sample firms for the other two periods. The matched sample 
research approach, as recommended by Ghazali and Weetman (2006), is then used to capture 
the effect of changes in corporate governance regulations on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. The annual reports of sample firms are retrieved from the BMSE. 
  
3.2 Dependent variable –voluntary disclosure index 
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This study uses a self-constructed disclosure index to gauge the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. An extensive review of prior studies is undertaken to check for common 
determinants of voluntary disclosure especially those attributes applicable to developing 
countries. Drawing on prior disclosure studies in developing countries (eg. Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Barako, Hancock, and Izan, 2006; Alsaeed, 2005; Gul and Leung, 2004), a 
preliminary disclosure checklist consisting of 151 voluntary disclosure items is derived. This 
preliminary checklist is then thoroughly screened by two Malaysian Chartered Accountants 
to verify the relevance of each item to Malaysian reporting environment and to eliminate any 
reporting items that are mandatory in nature. The process results in the final list of 85 items to 
capture Malaysian corporate voluntary disclosure practices. These 85 items are categorised 
into: (i) corporate and strategic information; (ii) financial and capital market data; (iii) 
directors and senior management information; (iv) forward-looking information; and (v) 
corporate social responsibility. The checklist, as shown in Appendix 1, forms the basis of 
measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
  
Adopting Meek, Roberts, and Gray (1995) approach, this study does not weight any of the 
items comprising the voluntary disclosure index. Each item is scored as 1 if disclosed and 0 if 
it is not, subject to the applicability of the item concerned. Weighting of items is not used 
because the focus of this study is not directed at a particular user group. Moreover, prior 
research has shown that unweighted and weighted approaches produce very similar results 
when there are a large number of items included (Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley, 2004; 
Barako, Hancock, and Izan, 2006). Voluntary disclosure index score (VDIS) is calculated for 
each firm in each period, expressed as follows: 













where VDISjt is the voluntary disclosure index score for firm j year t; nj is the number of 
items applicable to j
th
 firm; jtn is the total possible maximum number of items (85); Xjt is 
voluntary disclosure item where a value of 1 is assigned if the firm discloses information 
about this item; and 0 if otherwise.             
 
3.3 Explanatory variables 
This study captures the strength of corporate governance by developing a score comprising 
thirteen governance items. The MCCG and Chapter 15 of the BMLR on corporate 
governance constitute authoritative and objective sources used for selection of corporate 
governance attributes. Past governance literature was used as a basis for selection of 
individual governance items. The thirteen governance attributes selected can be broadly 
classified into role duality, board composition, board sub-committees (audit, remuneration, 
nomination) structures, board policy and internal control systems. These attributes are used to 
create a composite proxy measure to capture the strength of a firm’s corporate governance 
structure (see Appendix 2). Each of the corporate governance attributes is measured as a 
dichotomous variable. A value of 1 is assigned for each attribute that is presumed to reinforce 
the voluntary disclosure practice of a firm, and 0 otherwise. A firm receives a score ranging 
from 0 to 13 depending on the number of attributes satisfied. Each firm in each period has the 
‘opportunity’ to incorporate any or all these attributes. Given this premise, the corporate 
governance score (CGS) are not adjusted as ‘not-applicable’ items. This approach is 
consistent with Taylor, Tower, and Neilson (2010). Firms with a low CGS are presumed to 
have weaker governance structure, leading to a reduced extent of voluntary disclosure. A 
higher score is believed to signal a stronger governance structure, leading to a greater extent 
of voluntary disclosure. The CGS, measured as a percentage, is treated as a continuous 




BMLR requires Malaysian listed companies to provide information on the proportion of 
shares owned by dominant shareholders in annual reports. Corporate ownership in Malaysia 
is characterized by a high level of concentration of equity shareholdings. Consistent with the 
World Bank (2005), this study measures ownership concentration, a proxy measure of 
ownership structure, as the ratio of total shares owned by top five shareholders to total 
number of outstanding shares. Appendix D summarises the operationalisation and 
measurement of the independent and control variables. 
 
3.4 Model development 
A linear multiple regression model is constructed and performed to investigate the 
explanatory power of the predictor variables. The model is used to test the cross-sectional 
(within each period) associations between the dependent variable of voluntary disclosure, the 
independent variables of corporate governance and ownership concentration, and the control 
variables. The following model is estimated: 
VDISjt = β0 + β1CGSjt + β2OCONjt + β3FSIZEjt + β4LEVjt + β5IND1jt+ β6IND2jt 
  + β7IND3jt + β8IND4jt + β9IND5jt +  jt 
 
where subscript jt refers as firm j in year t; VDISjt = voluntary disclosure index; CGSjt = 
corporate governance score being the composite measurement of thirteen corporate 
governance attributes; OCONjt = ownership concentration measured as the ratio of total 
shares held by top five shareholders to total number of shares issued; FSIZEjt = firm size 
measured as natural log of total assets; LEVjt  = leverage as ratio of debt to equity; IND1jt - 
IND5jt = 1 if the company is in the consumer product sector, industrial product sector, 
construction and property sector, trading and services sector and plantation sector 
respectively; 0 if otherwise; β0 = intercept; β1 - β9 = estimated coefficient for each item;  jt = 
error term.  
 
4.0 Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
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The descriptive results of VDIS and five sub-categories information are provided as Table 1. 
There is a wide range in VDIS throughout the study period. In 1996, the lowest VDIS is 1.2% 
and the highest VDIS is 54.9% with a mean of 22.9%. In 2001, the VDIS ranges from 5.9% 
to 71.9% with a mean of 30.4%. The VDIS ranges from 6.5% to 80.5% with a mean of 34.1% 
in 2006.  There is an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian listed firms 
from 1996 to 2006. The extent of voluntary disclosure is relatively high as compared to that 
in other developing countries. For instance, typical disclosures exhibited in other developing 
countries are: 28.9% in Singapore (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006); 24.2% in Vietnam (Tower, 
Anh-Vu, and Scully, 2011); 19.0% in Kuwait (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). The 
extent of disclosures for each sub-category of information increases from 1996 to 2006. 
There is a marked increase in the disclosure of information relating to directors and senior 
management from 15.1% in 1996 to 50.8% in 2006. All the other categories of information 
demonstrate a moderate increase over the entire observation period viz. corporate and 
strategy information (34.8% in 1996 to 44.3% in 2006); financial and capital market data 
information (25.0% to 33.9%); forward-looking information (23.0% to 31.2%); and corporate 
social responsibility information (10.0% to 23.8%). The non-parametric Kolmogorov-
Smirnow normality test (K-S Lilliefors) reported in Table 1 indicates that VDIS is 
approximately normally distributed.  
 
Table 2 reports the paired t-test for mean VDIS over the observation periods. The analysis 
shows that the increase in mean VDIS for sample firms between 1996-2001, 2001-2006 and 
1996-2006 is statistically significant at the 1% level. The largest increase occurs between 
1996 and 2001 (32.2%) while the increase is moderate between 2001 and 2006 (12.3%). Over 
the eleven-year study period, the increase in average voluntary disclosure between 1996 and 
16 
 
2006 is 48.5%. The results show that there is a significant increase in the extent of voluntary 
disclosure of Malaysian listed firms from 1996 to 2006. 
 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for corporate governance and ownership concentration 
predictor variables in each year. Sample firms exhibit a weak corporate governance structure 
in 1996 (pre-financial crisis) with a mean CGS of 23.4%. Governance structure is enhanced 
over time with an increase in mean CGS of 48.7% in 2001 and a further increase to 67.8% in 
2006. Sample firms have a persistently high ownership concentration in the hands of top five 
shareholders over the observation periods. The mean OCON in 1996 is 61.9% although it 
declines slightly to 58.5% in 2006.  
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients for the continuous explanatory variables as well as the 
dependent variable in each period are reported as Table 4. The firms’ strength of corporate 
governance structure is not correlated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in 1996. There 
is a significant correlation between VDIS and CGS in 2001 and 2006, while similar 
correlation findings are found between VDIS and OCON in all years under study. The 
directionality of these correlations is consistent with that hypothesised. The correlation 
coefficients between the continuous explanatory variables are all below 0.4. Thus, the 
multicollinearity in this study is considered non-problematic.  
 
5.2 Multivariate results  
The results of the multivariate test of the hypotheses developed are presented in Table 5. The 
explanatory power of the cross-sectional regression model; as indicated by the values of 
adjusted R-squared of 41.6% in 1996, 48.1% in 2001 and 51.7% in 2006; compares 
favourably with prior disclosure studies in other developing countries such as Barako, 
17 
 
Hancock, and Izan (2006) [53.0%]; Eng and Mak (2003) [20.6%]; Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006) [36.1%]; Haniffa and Cooke (2002) [47.9%]; Ho and Wong (2001) [31.4%]; and 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) [52.0%]. The model in this study is highly significant (p < 0.01), 
indicating that the model explains a substantial percentage of the variations in the level of 
corporate voluntary disclosure.  
 
There is a positive and statistically highly significant association between voluntary 
disclosures and corporate governance structure in 2001 (p < 0.01) and 2006 (p < 0.01). The 
results support the positive association as hypothesized. Our results could potentially relate to 
the implementation of the MCCG in 2001 where one of its tenets is to enhance corporate 
transparency and accountability. The enhanced corporate governance structure and 
disclosure-based regime implemented post currency-crisis may have had an influence in 
managerial disclosure choice. The results suggest that better governed firms make greater 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 5 reveals that ownership concentration is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with voluntary disclosure in all the three years under study, supporting H2. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Birt et al. (2006) and Jiang, Habib, and Hu (2011) 
who report that a concentrated ownership structure can have a positive influence on 
managements’ disclosure decisions. The positive association between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure supports the notion that concentrated ownership 
structure implies stronger monitoring capacity by dominant shareholders thereby influencing 
management to disclose voluntary information more extensively. The positive relationship 
concurs with the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) although it is inconsistent with the 
agency theoretical stance. A possible explanation for this is that dominant shareholders’ 
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control is stronger in providing effective monitoring in Malaysia. The substantial 
shareholders comprising blockholders, government agencies, banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds etc. help to create strong incentives to monitor corporate disclosure practices to 
reduce information asymmetry. 
 
With regard to the control variables, firm size is consistently positively and statistically 
significantly (at the 1% levels) associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in all years. 
These results confirm that the firm size is a very important attribute associated with the extent 
of voluntary disclosures in annual reports. Reasons for this association may relate to public 
scrutiny, expanded resources and the need to suppress high agency cost typical of large firms. 
Leverage lacks statistical significance in all years, suggesting that a company’s gearing status 
has no bearing on the extent of information voluntarily disclosed. There appears to be no 
evidence that the extent of voluntary disclosure is industry-related. The coefficients for the 
rest of the industry-type dummies are not significant except in 2006 where trading and 
service sector tends to disclose less voluntary information disclosure. Relative secrecy on the 
part of companies in this sector may reflect a fear incurring proprietary costs through 
disclosure to competitors. 
 
6.0 Robustness tests  
Additional tests are conducted to check the robustness of the findings. To supplement the 
earlier findings, data is transformed and run using rank regression and normal scores 
approaches (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Cooke, 1998). The results of the additional rank 
regression and normal scores analysis (not shown for brevity) highlight that corporate 
governance structure is positively and significantly associated with voluntary disclosure in 
2001 and 2006; and ownership structure is a significant positive predictor of the extent of 
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voluntary disclosure in all three observation periods across the two approaches. Importantly, 
the additional tests highlight that the variables identified as significant predictors of the extent 
of voluntary disclosure are the same as the main statistical test on untransformed data. 
Overall, the results are robust across different approaches. This multiple-tiered analysis 
provides comfort to the validity of the main statistical findings.  
 
The multiple regression model used in the study implicitly assumes the exogenous 
determination of both corporate governance and ownership structure variables. However, a 
concern arises from the possibility of the endogenous determination of corporate governance 
and ownership structure. The model may suffer from causality as well as unobserved 
heterogeneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) where the explanatory corporate governance and 
ownership structure variables may be endogenous and correlated with the residuals in the 
regression model. Should endogeneity adversely bias the OLS models used in this study, it 
would be difficult to interpret the association between corporate governance and ownership 
structure and voluntary disclosure. The study takes advantage of the longitudinal design of 
this study and employs panel data OLS regression with firm fixed-effects to eliminate 
endogeneity, as suggested by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999). The observation from 
the pooled results (not shown for brevit) shows that the model is significant with an F-value 
of 33.15 and an adjusted R
2
 of 53.4%. The result indicates that voluntary disclosure by 
Malaysian companies has increased over the eleven-year period and is statistically 
significant. Corporate governance structure, ownership structure and firms size are positively 
and significantly associated with voluntary disclosure practices.  
 
Another method to address potential endogeneity is to examine the association between 
changes in the levels of governance (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). This approach is 
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appropriate since there is less likely to be a corresponding change in any potential omitted 
variable that is correlated with both the dependent and independent variables. The setback of 
this approach is that the change in independent variables may be relatively minor between 
periods compared to the change in dependent variable. Nonetheless, the change multiple 
regression is conducted and the results (not shown for brevity) indicate that there is no 
significant association between the change in voluntary disclosure and the change in 
corporate governance and ownership structure. This further analysis lessens any possible 
concern of the endogeneity in the determination of corporate governance and ownership 
structure. 
 
7.0 Implications and conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent of voluntarily disclosed information 
within the annual reports of Malaysian listed firms from 1996 to 2006. The extent of 
Malaysian listed firm’s voluntary disclosures in annual reports increases from 1996 to 2006. 
The result suggests that firms are disclosing greater information of a discretionary nature in 
the post currency crisis period compared to pre-crisis period. There is a greater increase in 
voluntary disclosures between 1996 and 2001 although moderate increase between 2001 and 
2006. The results suggest the regulatory efforts have influenced corporate communication of 
information on a voluntary basis in annual reports. 
 
The regression results show that corporate governance structure is a significant predictor in 
2001 and 2006. The implementation of MCCG provides the catalyst for a concerted effort to 
enhance corporate transparency and accountability. Our results also lend support to prior 
studies of the use of a corporate governance index as a measure of the effectiveness of 




The positive association between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure in all 
years highlight that Malaysian firms with large shareholder concentration promote more 
extensive disclosures. Specifically, the Malaysian regulators may encourage equity 
participation by varying investors groups who have the potential to strengthen corporate 
transparency. This would ensure firms dominated by large shareholders have better incentives 
and resources to monitor management decisions and reduce agency costs, as posited by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). This is of particularly importance if Malaysian firms are to 
penetrate international capital markets as a source to raise funds to finance economic 
activities. 
 
Overall, the empirical results of this study contribute to the extant literature by providing 
valuable insights regarding the extent of voluntary information disclosure among listed firms 
of an emerging economy – Malaysia. Although the extent of voluntary disclosure has 
increased over the 11-year period, the Malaysian regulators should continue to strengthen the 
regulatory framework regarding the level of listed firms’ disclosure practices. These results 
may assist other East Asian countries which largely have the same governance architecture as 
Malaysia to improve market transparency through greater disclosures. 
 
This study is not without limitations. Although the study documents the expected association 
between the explanatory variables and dependent variable, it does not consider the causal 
relationship. Using the multiple regression model, this study is not possible, nor is it 
intended, to ascertain whether independent variables directly influenced the dependent 
variable. This study may suffer from survivorship biasness as it includes same firms in the 
sample over the three periods. It is suggested that in the future, research should explore the 
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use of other statistical analysis e.g. Structural Equation Modelling to examine the causal 
relationship. Future research could extend the study by undertaking a comparative study with 
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1996       
Mean 22.97 34.802 25.00 15.08 23.0 10.04 
Standard Deviation  11.31 0.150 0.19 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Minimum 1.17 0.000 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.70 
Maximum 54.88 0.731 0.78 0.13 0.00 0.56 
Skewness 0.48 0.005 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
K-S Significance 0.39 0.842 0.05 0.74 0.09 0.11 
2001       
Mean 30.38 41.09 30.57 44.67 27.02 17.57 
Standard Deviation 13.59 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.18 
Minimum 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 71.95 0.81 0.83 1.00 0.60 0.69 
Skewness 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
K-S Significance  0.67 0.97 0.20 0.46 0.09 0.18 
2006       
Mean 34.84 44.30 33.90 50.75 31.18 23.83 
Standard Deviation 17.11 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.24 
Minimum 6.49 0.000 0.00 0.25 0.000 0.00 
Maximum 80.49 0.85 0.890 1.00 0.73 0.83 
Skewness 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 
K-S significance  0.21 0.51 0.12 0.39 0.05 0.20 
Legend: The table provides the descriptive statistics of the overall extent of voluntary disclosure and the five major 
sub-categories of voluntary disclosure. These sub-categories included CSI = corporate and strategic disclosure 
index; FCMI = financial and capital market data disclosure index; DSMI = directors and senior management 
disclosure index; FLI = forward-looking disclosure index; and CSRI = corporate social responsibility disclosure 
index.  
 
TABLE 2: Paired t-test of firms’ overall VDIS 
 1996 – 2001 2001 – 2006 1996 – 2006 
Mean of paired differences 7.403 3.741 11.144 
% change VDIS (VDISt-VDISt-1) 32.226 12.316 48.511 
Correlation 0.814* 0.819* 0.748* 
t-Stat -9.371 -4.393 -10.049 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Legend: The table shows the paired sample t-test results for mean VDIS performed by comparing 1996 with 2001, 
2001 and 2006, and 1996 and 2006. The percentage change in mean VDIS (VDISt-VDISt-1) between two years is 







TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 CGS OCON 
 1996 2001 2006 1996 2001 2006 
Mean 23.390 48.692 67.769 61.866 57.538 58.477 
Median 23.080 48.150 68.230 62.100 59.515 59.715 
Standard Deviation 10.192 19.158 13.015 14.915 18.708 15.140 
       
Minimum 0.000 7.690 38.460 24.400 17.890 22.100 
Maximum 46.150 92.310 92.310 88.150 90.700 90.420 
Legend: The table reports the descriptive statistics of CGS and OCON for each period.  
 
 
TABLE 4: Pearson Correlation Matrix  
1996 VDIS CGS OCON FSIZE LEV 
VDIS 1     
CGS 0.152 1    
OCON 0.327* -0.004 1   
FSIZE 0.364* 0.254** 0.035 1  
LEV -0.119 -0.125 -0.171 0.108 1 
2001      
VDIS 1     
CGS 0.463* 1    
OCON 0.295* 0.276* 1   
FSIZE 0.403* 0.267* 0.129 1  
LEV -0.016 -0.123 -0.376* 0.149 1 
2006      
VDIS 1     
CGS 0.214** 1    
OCON 0.307* 0.061 1   
FSIZE 0.479* 0.025 0.031 1  
LEV -0.012 -0.099 -0.359* 0.189 1 


















TABLE 5: Cross- Sectional multivariate analysis of determinant of voluntary disclosure  
 1996 2001 2006 
Adjusted R2 0.416 0.481 0.517 
Durbin Watson 2.218 2.109 2.128 
F Statistics 9.806 12.563 14.073 
Significance 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P-value Coefficients t Stat P- Value 
Intercept  -58.018 -5.249 0.000* -58.243 -5.425 0.000* -59.361 -7.476 0.000* 
CGS + 0.072 0.799 0.213 0.209 3.719 0.000* 2.270 2.877 0.002* 
OCON - 0.213 3.485 0.000* 0.094 1.532 0.048** 0.261 2.705 0.003* 
FSIZE + 11.228 6.935 0.000* 122.408 6.346 0.000* 18.860 8.743 0.000* 
LEV - -5.223 -1.091 0.139 -1.601 -0.281 0.389 1.690 0.314 0.377 
IND1 +/- 2.336 0.773 0.425 0.604 0.183 0.855 - - - 
IND2 +/- 2.683 0.898 0.399 -0.355 -0.103 0.918 -4.580 -1.207 0.230 
IND3 +/- 1.282 0.437 0.646 -0.164 -0.049 0.961 -3.067 -0.772 0.442 
IND4 +/- - - - -1.753 -0.489 0.626 -11.468 -2.687 0.004* 
IND5 +/- 4.844 1.494 0.141 - - - -4.992 -1.214 0.228 
The table shows the results of the regression model which tests the association between voluntary disclosure for all sample firms over each of the three years (1996, 2001 
& 2006) against the independent and control variables. The coefficients of the excluded dummy variables are 1.000 since they act as benchmarks for the included 
dummies. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the CGS, 














APPENDIX 1 Voluntary Disclosure Instrument  
Corporate and strategic disclosure index (CSD) 
1 Financial highlights – 5 years and more 
2 Pictures of major types of product 
3 Discussion of company’s major products / services / projects 
4 Information on new product development 
5 Discussion of industry trends (past) 
6 Information on acquisitions and expansion 
7 Statement of ways of improvement in product quality 
8 General statement of corporate strategy 
9 Organization structure /  group chart 
10 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 
11 Discussion of competitive environment 
12 Information on disposal and cessation 
13 A statement of corporate goals 
14 Vision and mission statement 
15 Description of marketing and distribution network for products/services  
16 Statement of ways of improvement in customer service 
17 Discussion of principal markets 
18 Actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal 
19 Brief history of the company 
20 Significant events calendar 
21 Reasons for the acquisitions & expansion 
22 Impact of strategy on current and/or future results 
23 Discussion about major regional economic development 
24 Reasons for the disposal and cessation 
25 Description of R&D projects 
26 Impact of competition on current profit 
27 Company’s contribution to the national economy 
28 Information about regional political stability 
Financial and capital market data disclosure index (FCMD) 
29 Key financial ratios eg. return on assets, return on shareholders’ funds, leverage, 
liquidity 
30 Review of operations by divisions - operating profit 
31 Review of operations - productivity 
32 Review of current financial results, discussion of major factors underlying 
performance 
33 Effect of acquisitions & expansion on results 
34 Effect of disposal & cessation on results 
35 Statement concerning wealth created eg. value added statement 
31 
 
36 Volume of shares traded (trend)  
37 Volume of shares traded (year-end) 
38 Share price information (trend)  
39 Share price information (year-end) 
40 Market capitalization (trend) 
41 Market capitalization (year-end) 
42 Analysis of distribution of shareholdings by type of shareholders 
43 Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown 
44 Segmental reporting on size, growth rate on product market 
45 Segment reporting on all lines of business production data 
46 Segment reporting on geographical capital expenditure 
47 Segment reporting on geographical production 
Directors and senior management disclosure index (DSMD) 
48 Academic & professional qualifications of directors 
49 Position or office held by executive directors 
50 Picture of senior management team 
51 Senior management responsibilities, experience and background 
Forward-looking disclosure index (FLD) 
52 Discussion of specific external factors affecting company’s prospects (economy, 
politics, technology) 
53 Discussion of company’s prospects (general) 
54 Discussion of likely effect of business strategy on future performance 
55 Discussion of future industry trend 
56 Discussion of future products/services research and development activities 
57 Planned research and development expenditure 
58 Planned capital expenditure 
59 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure 
60 Key financial data (quantitative) forecasts eg. sales revenues, profit, EPS 
61 Qualitative forecasts of sales, revenues, profits, EPS 
62 Forecast assumptions provided 
Corporate social responsibility disclosure index (CSRD) 
63 General philanthropy 
64 Participation in government social campaigns 
65 Community programs (health and education) implemented 
66 Statement of company environmental policies 
67 Environmental protection program implemented 
68 Awards for environmental protection 
69 Support rendered for public/private action designed to protect environment 
70 Employee’s appreciation 
71 Picture of employees’ welfare 
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72 Discussion of employees’ welfare 
73 Number of employees for the last two or more years 
74 Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution 
75 Categories of employees by level of qualifications 
76 Corporate policy on employee training 
77 Amount spent on training 
78 Nature of training provided 
79 General redundancy / retrenchment information 
80 Indication of employee morale e.g. turnover, strikes and absenteeism 
81 Information about employee workplace safety 
82 Standard injury, lost day, and absentee rates and number of fatalities 
83 Health and safety standards 
84 Discussion of product safety 



































APPENDIX 2: Corporate Governance Attributes 
  Attributes Scoring 
CG1 Chairman who is independent of Chief Executive Officer 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG2 Independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third 
of the board membership 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG3 
Board has defined policy of management responsibilities of the 
board and CEO 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG4 
Audit committee chaired by independent non-executive directors 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG5 
Audit committee comprises at least three directors, majority of 
whom are independent 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG6 
At least two members of audit committee have accounting or 
related financial management expertise 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG7 
Remuneration committee chaired by independent non-executive 
director 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG8 
Remuneration committee consists wholly of non-executive 
directors 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG9 
Structured remuneration policy in place, where remuneration to 
directors is contingent of performance 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG10 
Disclosure requirement in the annual report of the details of 
remuneration to each director 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG11 
Nomination committee consists exclusively of non-executive 
directors, a majority of whom are independent 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG12 
Does nomination committee adopt a formal procedure for 
appointments to the board? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
CG13 
Maintain sound system of internal control - financial, operational, 
compliance and risk management - to safeguard shareholders' 
investment and company assets 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Source: High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (2000) and Bursa Malaysia (n.d.) 
Legend: Thirteen corporate governance (CG) attributes derived from the principles and best practices of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. To create a composite proxy measure (denoted CGS) to capture 
the strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure, a value of one is assigned to the corporate 
governance conditions outlined. A firm receives a CGS score ranging from 0 to 13 depending on the 
number of conditions satisfied. A CGS score is calculated for each firm and financial year of the study 
period. The CGS, measured as a percentage, is treated as a continuous variable. 
 
 
